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To Make War on Cotton: The 
Opportunities of Imperial 
Geography and the British 
Textile Industry  
Clint Alley 
 
Much has been made of the confidence held by Confederate leaders of 
a quick military victory at the outset of the American Civil War. The 
concept of defeat on the battlefield was alien to white southerners of all 
social stations. On the eve of the war, Senator James Hammond of 
South Carolina, in a speech that has since been dubbed the “Cotton is 
King” speech, remarked memorably that, if pressed to fight, the South 
could raise not just a defensive force of peaceful citizens pressed into 
service, but “an army of soldiers—men brought up on horseback, with 
guns in their hands” against a northern invasion.1 Southerners’ belief in 
their own invincibility before, during, and even after the Civil War is a 
phenomenon that has enjoyed a new birth of attention by scholars over 
the past decade.    
But a topic less-discussed—and arguably more important—
than the concept of the self-perception of southern invincibility on the 
battlefield is the faith held by Confederates in their own economic 
invincibility. To southern leaders, there was no stronger bulwark than 
the quality of their cotton, and no fort more impregnable than the 
                                                          
1 United States Congress. Appendix to the Congressional Globe: 
Containing Speeches, Important State Papers, Laws, Etc. of the First 
Session, Thirty-Fifth Congress, 70.  
world’s need for the king of cash crops.  The hinge upon which all of 
their economic hopes and dreams rested was Britain, with its booming 
textile industry and ravenous cotton mills. Cheap, ready-made clothing 
was perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the Industrial Revolution, 
and southern leaders saw the cotton fields of the South as the soil from 
which the backbone of the British economy sprang. Later in the 
“Cotton is King” speech to the United States Senate, Hammond 
remarked that, should shipments of southern cotton grind to a halt, 
“England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world 
with her, save the South.”2    
Southerners’ faith in the saving power of southern cotton ran 
strong throughout the Civil War. Even as Confederate ports became 
clogged with thousands of tons of baled, unshipped cotton, the trade 
relationship built around the crop between Britain and the South was 
the foundation of Confederate hopes for British recognition and the use 
of the British Navy to destroy the Union naval blockade. However, it 
was a hope which would remain unrealized: when making their 
overtures to British diplomats and making their promises of British 
salvation to embattled southern citizens, Confederate leaders failed to 
take into account the opportunities presented by the sweeping 
geography of the British Empire. The tenacity shown by the British 
textile industry during the American Civil War would serve not only to 
undermine the Confederate economy during the Civil War and thus 
unintentionally help the Union to win the war, but would also help to 
launch, in earnest, the cotton industries of up-and-coming cotton 
producing parts of the British Empire, particularly Egypt and India.  
                                                          
2 Ibid., 70.  
However, before examining the evidence of this geographic 
and economic anomaly, it is important to make a brief apology to the 
reader and to verify some basic facts. Apologies are necessary because 
of the dated nature of some of the secondary source material in this 
paper. The study of the politics and geography of the transatlantic 
cotton trade is a field that was of great interest to American and British 
scholars of the early twentieth century, when both the transatlantic 
cotton trade and the British Empire were still thriving, ever-present 
parts of the lives of a great many people on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Indeed, the long-staple cotton trade between Britain and the sea islands 
of Georgia and the Carolinas carried on much the same as it always had 
as late as the 1950s. However, regardless of the dated nature of some of 
the secondary sources, the data contained in these sources are worthy of 
revisiting, especially when one considers their nearness in time to the 
events they examine.    
As to the basic facts of the cotton trade, primarily, the question 
must be asked as to how important, in actuality, was the cotton trade 
between Britain and the South during the mid-19th century? 
Contemporary southerners certainly made much of the relationship, 
especially when Yankee ears were present. Southern politicians like 
Senator Hammond, both before and during the war, seemed to regard 
the economic relationship between the South and Britain as almost 
symbiotic. In the “Cotton is King” speech, Hammond painted a vivid—
and somewhat accurate—picture of southern cotton rescuing both 
Britain and the North from economic ruin during the Panic of 1857, 
telling his northern peers in the Senate:  
When the abuse of credit had destroyed 
credit and annihilated confidence, when 
thousands of the strongest commercial 
houses in the world were coming down, and 
hundreds of millions of dollars of supposed 
property evaporating in thin air, when you 
came to a dead luck, and revolutions were 
threatened, what brought you up?  
Fortunately for you, it was the 
commencement of the cotton season, and we 
have poured in upon you one million six 
hundred thousand bales of cotton just at the 
crisis to save you from destruction.3  
   But, aside from the fact that southern resilience during the 
Panic of 1857 was, for the most part, an ephemeral and well-timed 
stroke of good luck for southern planters, reason would hold that 
nascent nationalists, especially in an emotionally-charged political 
atmosphere like that of the United States in the 1850s and 1860s, would 
naturally tout the economic prowess of their new country. Placing the 
Confederacy on (or above) the same economic rung as the most 
powerful empire on earth—an empire which was also in possession of 
the most powerful navy on earth—was no doubt intended as a potent 
threat to the North.  
But what was the prevailing opinion among Britons regarding 
the importance of Britain’s cotton trade with the South? As an article 
published in the May 1861 edition of The North British Review read, 
there was no doubt that the trade was an important facet of the British 
economy, with some Britons going so far as to say that “no trade has 
                                                          
3 Ibid.  
ever grown so rapidly or assumed such gigantic proportions.”4 In 
addition to the South supplying five-sevenths of  
Britain’s imported cotton in 1860, contemporary estimates credited 
cotton imports with providing work to some four million men, women, 
and children in the nation’s £65,000,000 textile industry, and projected 
the industry to experience an unprecedented boom in the coming 
decades as the world population continued to grow at incredible strides 
and cotton garments remained among the cheapest and most efficient 
types of clothing.5 The question was whether the southern monopoly on 
British cotton imports was the keystone of the British economy that  
Confederate leaders made it out to be. Did British people share 
Hammond’s sentiment that a disruption in the southern cotton trade 
would cause England to “topple headlong?”6    
The answer, as with most things pertaining to Victorian 
Britain, depended in large part on the social and vocational position of 
the answerer. Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, an 
officer of the British Army famous for penning a diary of his three 
months spent travelling the Confederacy during the Civil War, 
recognized that the trade in cotton was an important relationship. 
However, Fremantle also intoned that the Confederacy was much more 
reliant on Britain than vice versa, especially in the event of a southern 
victory. Waxing prophetic in 1863, Fremantle wrote in his diary that:  
                                                          
4 Charles Adams, ed. Slavery, Secession, & Civil War: Views from the 
United Kingdom and Europe, 1856-1865 (Lanham, Maryland: The 
Scarecrow Press, 2007), 246.  
5 Ibid., 246.  
6 United States Congress, Congressional Globe, 70.  
The South looks to England for everything 
when this war is over;—she wants our 
merchants to buy her cotton, she wants our 
ships to carry it;— she is willing that 
England should supply her with all the 
necessaries which she formerly received 
from the North.7  
  Although Fremantle’s attitude toward the Confederate struggle 
for independence is generally sympathetic throughout his diary, this 
passage seems to belie a paternalistic attitude toward the southern 
economy. As a member of a very old and aristocratic family, educated 
at  
Sandhurst and destined for a career of rank, merit, and military glory, it 
is not surprising that  
Fremantle’s perspective on the economic situation between the two 
powers is distant and aloof. 
His economic mindset toward the South fits a trend which existed 
during this period among the British middle- and upper-classes which 
regarded the import of southern cotton as a means of exerting economic 
power and influence over the region; a sort of informal imperialism 
which was introduced before the American Revolution and had 
continued mostly unchanged in the American South since that time. 
This idea ran that the South might, indeed, supply a necessary raw 
material in large quantity, but in the end southerners would always be 
                                                          
7 Arthur J.L. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, April-
June 1863 (Project Gutenburg, 2007), 229.  
much more reliant on the Empire for finished products than Britain 
relied on the South for cotton, beside the fact that the monopoly on 
cotton held by the South at the outset of the 1860s would certainly be 
short lived.    
However aloof this attitude might seem, it was rooted in logic 
more than highhandedness. The simple geography of the British Empire 
held that an alternate source would arise should the valve of southern 
cotton be shut by any calamity—manmade or otherwise. The North 
British Review shared this reflection of cotton economy at the outset of 
the Civil War:  
The probabilities are that in 1871 the free 
labour [non-slaveholding] countries will be 
able to produce nearly as much cotton as the 
increased British consumption will require; 
and with this change, and its accompanying 
revolution in price, the great Southern 
monopoly must inevitably be broken up.  
India will then rival the United States in her 
production—Africa, begert with free 
settlements, will supply us with millions of 
pounds—Greece and Turkey are beginning 
cotton cultivation—Cyprus has devoted 
80,000 acres to it—and Tunis and Australia 
are moving in the same direction.8  
                                                          
8 Adams, Slavery, Secession, & Civil War: Views from the United 
Kingdom and Europe, 1856-1865, 247.  
  Conversely, the British working class saw their lot much more 
bound with the importation of Confederate cotton than the Fremantles 
and magazine editors of the world. The fibrous bond between the mill 
and the field ran especially thick in the “textile towns in  
Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Scotland, and Ulster.”9 In these 
manufacturing regions, southern cotton was the lifeblood of the 
working class. While many of the textile workers seemed to share the 
general disdain for slavery common among British people of the time, 
replacing southern cotton with the still-developing cotton markets of 
the Empire and other “freelabour” states meant the risk of losing both 
quality and precious production time. For them, the blockade of 
southern ports was a matter of urgency; it meant no work, no food, and 
no security. Had they the means or the interest to read the words of 
Senator Hammond when he threatened that the whole of the civilized 
world would come to a screeching halt with no southern cotton, the 
working classes of the textile regions would no doubt have vehemently 
agreed; for many of them, the world did come to a screeching halt.    
The effect of the American Civil War on the economy of the 
cotton districts— particularly in Lancashire, where the lack of cotton 
decimated the local economy, spurring rampant unemployment, 
welfare-receipt, and mass-emigration—was so dire that the period of 
1861-65 is still popularly known today as the time of The Cotton 
Famine. This economic codependence is expressed in numerous extant 
newspaper records, diaries, and letters, but is perhaps most artistically 
recorded in a line from a Lancashire poem by Samuel Laycock called 
Th’ Shurat Weaver’s Song, which reads:  
                                                          
9 R.J.M. Blackett, Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 7.  
O dear! if Yond’ Yankees could only just see  
Heaw they’re clammin’ an’ starvin’ poor weavers loike me,  
Aw think they’d 
soon settle their 
bother, an’ strive. 
To send us some 
cotton to keep us 
alive.10  
  Whether examining the cotton trade from the perspective of 
the aristocracy and middle class or from that of the working class, it is 
clear that the possession of a worldwide empire created new 
opportunities for the British textile industry during the American Civil 
War. As the war churned on and the supply of the coveted American 
Sea-Island and Middling Orleans varieties of cotton, in particular, 
evaporated from storehouses and mills across Britain, British leaders 
and industrialists were forced to find other means of producing their 
finished products, lest they face the ugly specter of anarchy as the 
working class went month after month with no work.    
  A general understanding of the quality of different strains of 
cotton is needed to gain the full picture of what was at play during this 
crucial period for the British textile industry. American strains of cotton 
were undoubtedly of better quality and more suited to use in textile 
machinery than varieties grown in other parts of the world. The 
American South was particularly well-suited in terms of climate and 
                                                          
10 Samuel Laycock, “Th’ Shurat Weaver’s Song,” John Harland, ed., 
Ballads and Songs of Lancashire Ancient and Modern. Corrected, 
revised and enlarged by T.T. Wilkinson (London, 1875), 508.  
<http://www.archive.org/details/balladssongsofla00harluoft>, 
Accessed 27 June 2011.  
soil type to grow two varieties of cotton which most commonly fed the 
mills of Britain. Sea Island, a long-staple cotton which is believed to 
have originated in the tropics of South America, was cultivated on the 
islands off the coast of Georgia and South Carolina between the 1780s 
and the 1950s. Its “long, fine, silky fibers” were “unmatched on world 
markets” for two centuries.11 Sea Island cotton, when grown correctly, 
was considered a luxury item, and its fibers would often be mixed with 
silk to produce fine garments and other luxury textiles. The Middling 
Orleans strain of cotton was a short-staple variety, but was hardy and 
could be grown and exported in abundance from the fertile, virgin 
fields and humid climes of the South. Although a slew of cotton 
varieties were exported from the South, these two strains were 
predominant and represented the best that could be produced by the 
region.  
  The question of using an alternate source of cotton was not 
simply one of quantity, but of quantity and quality together. The 
antebellum South was unique in that it could produce high quality 
cotton in bulk, and the use of slave labor to plant, hoe, and harvest the 
crop ensured that plantation owners could usually sell their crop at a 
fair price and still turn a tidy profit. This was in stark contrast to 
varieties of cotton grown elsewhere in the world. India, for example, 
produced large quantities of a variety of cotton known as Surat. In 
addition to being a low quality plant, shipments of Surat were infamous 
among mill operators for being “ill-prepared, ill-cleaned, and even 
adulterated with such foreign substances as mud, leaves, and stones.”12 
                                                          
11 S.G. Stephens, “The Origins of Sea Island Cotton,” Agricultural 
History  50, no. 2 (1976): 391.  
12 Edward Meade Earle, “Egyptian Cotton and the American Civil 
War,” Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 41, no. 4: 1926) 
While Surat was not impossible to use in the mechanized production of 
textiles, it was not the preferred variety to use when making a finished 
product of any good quality.  
  This was the dilemma faced by British textile producers when 
the flow of affordable, high-quality cotton was cut off during the 
American Civil War. As Hammond had suggested in the “Cotton is 
King” speech, civil unrest began brewing in the hardest-hit districts not 
long after the blockade of Southern ports cut the total poundage of 
imported cotton by 27% in 1861, and then by almost 98% in 1862.13 
The town of Stalybridge, a region of Lancashire which boasted a 
thriving cotton-spinning industry before the Cotton Famine, became so 
full of “indigence and pauperism” that residents assembled by the 
hundreds at a Town Hall meeting in late 1862 to petition the Queen to 
recognize the Confederacy as a means of ending the war and putting 
them back to work.14 With nearly three-fourths of the residents of 
Stalybridge out of work by 1863, and more than a thousand people 
gone due to emigration, it is a small wonder that it was the site of the 
greatest civil unrest of the Cotton Famine. A detachment of soldiers 
from Manchester was called to the town in March 1863 to quell a riot 
that began among the poor over food and coal tickets.15  
  Had the English people been confined to the boundaries of 
their own island, this period may well have been the undoing of the 
British government, or it may have resulted in the salvation of the 
                                                          
13 Mary Ellison, Support For Secession: Lancashire and the American 
Civil War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 224.  
14 Philip S. Foner, British Labor and the American Civil War (New 
York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1981), 39.  
15 Ibid., 40  
Confederacy. However, by 1861, it was the good fortune of the British 
textile industry that the British flag waved over nearly ten million 
square miles of earth, much of which was hospitable to the cultivation 
of cotton. While Egypt would not formally become a part of the British 
Empire for another two decades, European influence in the region 
combined with a climate that was especially good for growing Sea 
Island cotton and other long-fiber varieties would provide an alternate 
source of raw material for the hungry mill workers in the cotton 
districts of England.  Some historians have even gone so far as to say 
that the revolution in cotton production in Egypt at this time played an 
important role in the British occupation of that country in the 1880s.  
  Of course, this new burst of cotton production did not occur in 
a vacuum.  Egypt had been home to native strains of cotton since the 
days of the Pharaohs, as had India. European speculators had attempted 
to grow Sea Island cotton in Egypt since the late eighteenth century, 
around the same time that it was first introduced to Georgia and the 
Carolinas from the Bahamas. After many years of false starts, bad 
harvests and political upheaval, the cotton industry in Egypt was off on 
a good foot by 1861, but still stood no contest to the gargantuan 
American market. Between the years of 1843 and 1857, the amount of 
cotton exported from Egypt to Britain leapt by 140%, an impressive 
trend, but one which still accounted for but five percent of the cotton 
imported by Britain in 1861.16 However, most, if not all, of this cotton 
was of the long-staple variety, which boded well for Egyptians seeking 
to stake a larger share of the cotton market during the war years.  
                                                          
16 Adams, Slavery, Secession, & Civil War: Views from the United 
Kingdom and Europe, 1856-1865, 247. 
 Interest in Egypt’s blossoming cotton industry in the 1860s was strong enough that talk of                                                  
State support of turning Egypt into a major player in the cotton market 
was so strong, in fact, that many of the agricultural resources, which 
had been used in previous years to produce Egypt’s cereal crops, were 
turned toward cultivating cotton. This left many people in the interior 
of Egypt in danger of starvation during the winter of 1862 and created a 
market for British foodstuffs.17  
  The fact that Egypt’s supply of cotton did not decrease to its 
prewar levels after the demise of the Confederacy and the reopening of 
southern ports acknowledges the fact that nothing short of an 
agricultural revolution occurred in Egypt during the years of the 
American Civil War. It was a politically significant event because 
Egypt became a place of interest to Britain during the years of the 
Cotton Famine. Although Egypt lacked the acreage and the soil quality 
necessary to break the American monopoly on British cotton imports, it 
proved that an alternate source of the precious crop was available and 
vindicated the aristocratic attitude that Britain could create new 
markets when old ones became unavailable. Beginning at the time of 
the American Civil War, the British held a vested interest in ensuring 
that law and order were maintained in Egypt. This policy of indirect 
imperialism built a framework that helped to formally usher Egypt into 
the Empire when the region lost political stability in the 1880s.    
  Similarly, the Indian cotton market experienced an 
unprecedented boom during the American Civil War. However, where 
Egypt experienced difficulties producing a great quantity of cotton, 
India produced great numbers of very poor-quality cotton. Like Egypt, 
                                                          
17 Earle, “Egyptian Cotton and the American Civil War,” 531.  
India had experienced a promising bump in cotton production before 
the first shots were fired at Fort Sumter. Between 1843 and 1857, 
India’s cotton output exploded by 288%.18 During the Cotton Famine, 
India supplied British mills with the largest share of cotton imports. 
Rising to the occasion, Indian cotton production increased by 81% from 
1860 to 1861, and went from comprising 15% of Britain’s cotton 
import in 1860 to 30% in 1861, and then to a staggering 75% in 1862. 
Even in 1867, two years after the war, India maintained a 38% share of 
the British cotton import, compared with the 42% of the market 
controlled by the United States.19  
  United States  India  
1860  80%  15%  
1861  65%  30%  
1862  3%  75%  
1863  4%  70%  
1864  4%  67%  
1865  18%  50%  
1866  38%  45%  
1867  42%  38%  
  
Fig. 1.1  
Percentage (by weight) of British cotton imports 
from U.S. and India during the 1860s. (Data from 
Ellison, p. 224. Percentages tallied by myself.)  
                                                          
18 Adams, Slavery, Secession, & Civil War: Views from the United 
Kingdom and Europe, 1856-1865, 247. 
19 Mary Ellison, Support For Secession: Lancashire and the American 
Civil War, 224. 
These numbers indicate that, as in Egypt, a cotton-centered 
agricultural revolution occurred in British-controlled India. However, 
unlike Egyptian markets, Indian cotton experienced success only in the 
quantity of cotton exported. After travelling to India and examining the 
methods used in the production of the Indian cotton crop, the president 
of the  
Manchester-based Cotton Supply Association said in a public speech in 
1862 that the trip had resulted in the association becoming well-versed 
in how to grow the “worst cotton on the face of the earth.”20  
The Surat cotton imported from India in large numbers during 
the Cotton Famine was generally looked down upon by mill workers 
and mill owners alike. However undesirable compared to long-staple 
American fibers, Surat filled a need that helped the British textile 
industry stay afloat during a precarious time. In addition to this, the 
exportation of Surat and other local varieties of cotton transitioned the 
Indian cotton trade from a local affair to an international one. During 
the Civil War years, Indian landowners were—for the first time—in 
command of a lucrative commodity desperately needed in foreign 
markets. India’s role in wartime cotton production not only caused 
Britain to make further use of its empire, it brought the empire to 
India’s doorstep.    
The American Civil War was a conflict unlike any the United 
States has ever known. When the smoke cleared in 1865, a new nation 
emerged from the ashes of the old, and a generation of Southern men 
had all but vanished from the earth. In addition to the psychological 
trauma and practical concerns raised by this loss of manpower, the 
                                                          
20 “The Supply of Cotton,” The Times (London), August 14, 1862. 
http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/. Accessed 29 June 2011.  
transatlantic cotton trade between the American South and Great 
Britain was mangled almost beyond recognition. Due in part to the loss 
of men, in part to the dissolution of the institution of slavery, and in 
part to the physical damage done to the earth by four years of constant 
combat and overgrown fields, it would be many years before the South 
could match the success of its antebellum cotton exports. But when the 
Southern cotton economy finally did recover, it found itself contending 
with several new players, players which had come to economic 
maturity by taking advantage of the expansive geography and economic 
needs of an empire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
